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July 30, 2001
Members of the International Organization of Securities Commissions:
The views expressed below represent those of the writer; they have not been considered by and
should not be imputed to the United States Independence Standards Board or to any Board
member.
As you may know, the ISB is closing today, but its Board authorized its staff to publish, as a
staff report, its conceptual framework. A copy of the document has been posted on our website
and can be found at
www.cpaindependence.org under "general information."
Our conceptual framework endorses the threats and safeguards approach in analyzing
independence issues to determine the proper regulatory approach to protect the public interest.
As you know, this approach is also being proposed by the International Federation of
Accountants and the European Commission, as well as other standard-setters and regulators
around the world - except for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
On June 28, 2001 Mr. Lynn Turner, the chief accountant of the SEC, addressed you in a speech
entitled Independence: A Convenant for the Ages. In that speech Mr. Turner asks:
"why didn't the Commission adopt a conceptual approach to auditors [sic]
independence as opposed to a rule based, proscriptive approach. More directly, why
was a "threats and safeguards" approach rejected?"
Mr. Turner then states that "[I]n the final release, the Commission did adopt a conceptual
approach based on four principles outlined in the preamble of the rule."
Although Mr. Turner describes those "principles" (called "factors" in the final SEC release) as
"the bedrock of the accounting profession's own rules for decades" they are inadequate if they
purport to represent a complete conceptual approach to independence. In fact, they are more
in the nature of threats, which, if significant, may be mitigated by safeguards. For example,
auditors, at least in the United States, have been assisting audit clients for decades by
preparing their income tax returns and then "advocating" the client's position with the taxing
authorities, with few if any resultant independence issues. Similarly, an auditor can - and
should - have a "mutual interest" with his or her client in producing reliable financial
statements.
Furthermore, Mr. Turner is using the term "threats and safeguards" in a different way from that
used in our conceptual framework and by the international standard setters referred to earlier.
He said in his remarks:

"[T]he threats and safeguards approach does not provide the type of definitive guidance or
transparency that enhances investor confidence in a firm's ability to make unbiased and
objective audit decisions. Under the "threats" and "safeguards" approach investors will not know
when a threat exists, whether any safeguards are in place or what the firm thinks is an
acceptable level of risk. A 'threats' and 'safeguards' approach also provides the auditor with the
ability to reduce the level of independence risk to an acceptable level based on his or her own
determination. Investors are asked to blindly believe that the auditor will do the right thing."
Thus, he implies that a conceptual approach that employs threats and safeguards replaces
mandated prohibitions and restrictions. That is clearly not the case. As described in detail in
our conceptual framework, the purpose of analyzing threats and potential safeguards is so that
standard-setters, regulators and other independence decision-makers can determine what
prohibitions, controls or restrictions to impose to mitigate threats. This process must have been
used by the SEC - implicitly if not explicitly - in arriving at the conclusions expressed in its
November 2000 release on auditor independence. For example, without using the terms, the
SEC concluded that it was too great a familiarity threat for an auditor to audit the work of a
member of the auditor's immediate family, and so it prohibited such relationships - a safeguard.
On the other hand, the SEC must have also concluded that the threat posed in auditing an inlaw was not so significant that blanket prohibition was warranted, and therefore no explicit
safeguard was mandated.
In other words, the threats and safeguards approach, properly applied, does not lead to a
situation where individual auditors or audit firms are deciding what type of activity or
relationship should be permitted or prohibited. Rather, it represents a principles-based
approach for standard setters to use in analyzing independence threats so that appropriate
safeguards, including prohibitions, can be mandated. It does not, as Mr. Turner states, result
"in the fox guarding the henhouse...because the accounting firm becomes the sole and final
arbiter of whether the accounting firm's independence has been impaired."
Mr. Turner also argues against the threats and safeguards approach because of his concern with
lack of compliance with mandated safeguards. But the lack of compliance he cites is with the
SEC's previous prohibitions on, for example, stock ownership. A major advantage of a
principles-based threats and safeguards approach is that the threats are adequately described,
along with the reasons for the mandated safeguards. As a result, the rules are more
understandable and therefore more likely to be remembered and complied with.
I believe that the threats and safeguards approach described in our conceptual framework will
serve to enhance effective auditing and thereby protect the public interest. I hope that you are
able to find the time to become familiar with it.
*****
During the last few years I have been very fortunate to have worked with independence
standard setters from IFAC, FEE, and other organizations, and they have been represented on
several ISB task forces. It has been particularly rewarding because we have learned from each
other and our approaches are now converging in very substantial ways. It would be very
unfortunate if, because of a misunderstanding, the SEC rejected that approach.
Sincerely,

Arthur Siegel
Executive Director

